BLACKMAIL AS PRIVATE JUSTICE
JENNIFER GERARDA BROWNt
You must not distortjustice;you must not show partiality;and you must

not accept bribes,for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and subverts the
cause of those who are in the right. Justice, and only justice, you shall
1
pursue.
[Any person... may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and
hear and be present, at all or any such tiyals as shall be there had or
passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert
2
manner.
INTRODUCTION

If people could legally blackmail criminals by threatening to
reveal their criminal activity unless paid a fee, would we have less
crime? This Article suggests that we might, and it explores the
implications of such a response. Along the way, the Article seeks to
identify the real "victims" of blackmail (if any), examine the
legitimacy of claims that blackmail should always be illegal, and
assess the rationales for prohibition.
This is not uncharted territory. Scholars of various disciplines
have worked over the years to explain the illegality of blackmail.
This Symposium attests to the popularity of blackmail's peculiar
puzzles. This Article, however, explores only a limited part of the
blackmail landscape;3 the exclusive focus is blackmail based on
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Others have set forth a more complete taxonomy of blackmail and have
explained the illegality of each category of blackmail separately. See, e.g., JOEL
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 240-76 (1988) (discussing blackmail and
debating whether the state can rightfully criminalize, on the ground of its moral
wrongfulness, conduct that harms no one); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail Privacy,
and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1820-36 (1993) (setting forth and
analyzing separately seven types of information that a blackmailer might threaten
to reveal). See generally James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 670-73 (1984) (criticizing eight theories of blackmail and
3
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incriminatinginformation ("incriminating blackmail"). Some argue
that this sort of blackmail is not "paradoxical" because the blackmailer offers or threatens to violate a legal or civic duty owed to
another.4 I argue, in contrast, that incriminating blackmail is
potentially paradoxical because it might confer social benefits not
produced by other kinds of blackmail.
If blackmailers were
permitted to collect a fee in exchange for silence about crimes, they
could impose costs on criminals that might increase the deterrence
achieved solely by public law enforcement. Granted, blackmail
might also benefit criminals by allowing them to postpone detection
by public officials. But this potential benefit to some criminals
would not necessarily exceed the additional costs imposed by blackmail.
Incriminating blackmail could impose additional costs on
criminals in various ways. First, if incriminating blackmail were
legal, some people might gain an incentive to acquire incriminating
information deliberately and use the information to blackmail
criminals. Second, in an imperfect world where many people know
about crimes but fail to report the wrongdoers to police, much
incriminating information is never put to use. If incriminating
blackmail were legal, some people with casually acquired information 5 (who do not report under the present system) might have an
incentive to put that information to use by blackmailing criminals.
Third, if criminals refused to pay in such a system, blackmailers who
expect to be repeat players might have an increased incentive to
report crimes to police, if only to make blackmail threats credible
in the future. Thus, even if blackmail caused the probability of
public detection to fall in some cases, this loss could be more than
arguing that blackmail should be criminalized because it involves misappropriating
a third party's leverage for the blackmailer's own advantage over the victim).
4 See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 240-46 (arguing that the illegality of incriminating blackmail presents a "paradox lost" because incriminating blackmail requires
the blackmailer to violate a duty to report crime); Douglas Ginsburg & Paul
Shechtman, Blackmail" An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1849,
1858 (1993) (asserting that the illegality of incriminating blackmail is explained by
the fact that the blackmailer "default[s] on a duty" to the state to report crime;
oddly accepting the duty to report crime as given despite their claim to give
blackmail a fresh analysis from the perspective of a "rational economic planner.").
5 People gain "casually acquired information" fortuitously-without expending
time or other resources on investigation. "Deliberately acquired information," as
the name suggests, requires some effort to uncover. See Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistak4 Disclosur Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14
(1978).
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compensated by increased use of both casually and deliberately
acquired information by private blackmailers. 6 We are faced at the
very least with an interesting empirical question, for if incriminating
blackmail could raise the potential costs of crime and thus improve
general deterrence, incriminating blackmail could be socially
beneficial in ways that other forms of blackmail are not.
Thus, this Article sets out the best case for blackmail before
concluding that it should be illegal. To analyze the wrongful
element of blackmail, we must define more fully the interests of the
blackmailer and the public. Their interests are clearly different, but
we must be more precise about the point at which their interests
diverge. As a vehicle for such discussion, this Article considers what
might happen if a legislature were to tailor the law of blackmail to
maximize and capture the potential social benefits of the activity
while also minimizing its social costs. This tailoring could be
achieved through an affirmative defense protecting blackmailers
who threaten to reveal
incriminating (notjust negative or embarrass7
ing) information.
Even in the "best case" scenario, this arguably productive form
of blackmail remains unappealing. The leading moral and economic
theories of blackmail do not sufficiently explain why such a scheme
is undesirable, but their failure does not signal that incriminating
blackmail should be allowed in this way. Even if one could
demonstrate with certainty that blackmail could efficiently deter
crime, most people would probably resist decriminalization. The
intuitive resistance to decriminalization of blackmail may reveal the
limits of the deterrence theory of criminal justice. Although
economists have cited deterrence as the primary and perhaps sole
purpose of criminal law, economic analysis is incomplete if it does
not account for the other ways in which public enforcement of the
criminal law is socially beneficial.
Incriminating blackmail may remain illegal despite its contribution to deterrence because blackmail might achieve deterrence at
6 In any case, the point is not that blackmail is devoid of benefit to the
criminal, but rather, that the literature about blackmail has given short shrift to
the ways blackmail might generally deter crime by imposing additional potential
costs on criminals-costs that might outweigh its benefits to them.
7 Cf.James Lindgren, More Blackmail Ink: A Critiqueof Blackmail, Inc., Epstein's
Theory of Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REV. 909, 921-22 (1984) (addressing the concern
that blackmail is illegal because it can lead blackmailees to steal in order to make

payments, Lindgren facetiously suggests a limited affirmative defense that would
excuse any blackmail that is "too moderate to induce theft").
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the expense of other goals of the criminal justice system. Judges,
legislators, and scholars have articulated these additional goals in
various ways, frequently citing retribution, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. Often, these purposes are associated with punishment-the criminal's fate in the wake of conviction. Additional goals
of criminal justice-education of the public and declaration of
societal norms-are reflected at all stages of the process, from
legislation to incarceration. These purposes are achieved only to
the extent that criminal justice activity has an audience-a community to whom and by whom the norms are declared. To achieve this
goal, criminal justice cannot be private justice. The public declaration of rights and responsibilities through interpretation and
application of the criminal laws remains an important political
function of the government, one that renders substantial, if intangible, social benefits. Although deterrence is one goal of criminal
justice, it may be less important than the declarative purpose of the
criminal law. The illegality of blackmail, a form of private justice,
reflects this desire to keep all law enforcement activity in the light
of public scrutiny and involvement.
I. THE BEST CASE FOR INCRIMINATING BLACKMAIL
A state could decriminalize blackmail when it involves threats to
disclose the blackmailee's criminal activity8 that has not yet been
detected or punished. Blackmail would generally remain illegal and
the state would continue to prosecute blackmail cases, but the law
would recognize an affirmative defense for cases involving blackmail
of criminals. 9 In a criminal prosecution for blackmail, the defen8 Threats to disclose criminal conduct are significantly different from threats to
reveal noncriminal, potentially embarrassing activity or conditions. When blackmailers threaten people involved in noncriminal activity, they deter activities that
are not prohibited by criminal law. The failure to criminalize signals a view that
when people violate certain norms, they have not damaged the social fabric
sufficiently that the community is aggrieved and has a public right of action
against the violators. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975) (stating that the illegality of
blackmail based on potentially embarrassing but not incriminating information
reflects "[t]he social decision not to regulate a particular activity" and "a judgment
that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover and punish it would be
socially wasted").
9 In a criminal case, the term "affirmative defense" traditionally describes the
allocation of a burden, either of production or persuasion, or both, to the
defendant. See 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2501, 2512, 2514 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., 1981). The nature of that burden is somewhat flexible: The
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dant could present an affirmative defense that the blackmailee was
engaged in criminal activity that was not yet punished, and the
blackmailer threatened to report the crime if the criminal didn't pay
up. The defendant would bear the burden of determining (and
later of proving by a preponderance of the evidence) 10 that the
blackmailee had indeed committed a crime covered by the affirma11
tive defense.
The legislature could reasonably determine for a variety of
reasons that blackmail would work efficiently as a private enforcement mechanism only with respect to certain crimes. It would have
to determine the specific crimes or categories of crimes subject to
blackmail, and include the list when recognizing the affirmative
defense. Crimes to be included would be determined by the
conditions and character of the jurisdiction and its specific law
enforcement priorities. 12 The key to the success of the affirmative
defense would be a legislative judgment that the class of criminals
defendant may simply have the burden of production of evidence regarding a
matter in defense; if the defendant satisfies that burden, the prosecution must
bear a burden of production and the burden of persuasion. In other instances,
the defendant bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 987-88 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
1o See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 988 ("Usually, the measure of
persuasion imposed on the defendant with regard to an affirmative defense is a
preponderance of the evidence."); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
206 (1977) ("[T]he State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity
unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. McCauley, 43
S.E.2d 454, 461 (W. Va. 1947) ("[T]he defendant's insanity must be proven by him
... by a preponderance of the evidence.") (footnote omitted).
" If blackmailers are to perform the function of private law enforcers, they
should be certain that they are imposing fines only where the law has actually been
broken. Moreover, forcing the blackmailer to bear the burden of persuasion on
the affirmative defense will protect the privacy of blackmailees more effectively
than a scheme in which the prosecutor must prove the noncriminality of the
blackmailee's conduct as an element of the crime. If the prosecutor has to prove
the noncriminal character of the blackmailee's conduct each time a blackmailer is
prosecuted, then the blackmailee's affairs are implicated in every case. If, on the
other hand, the blackmailer has available an affirmative defense based on the
criminal conduct of the blackmailee, the blackmailee's privacy will be disturbed
less frequently, and only in cases in which the defendant can produce some
evidence of the crime.
12 For example, the legislature might determine that in some neighborhoods or
communities, people readily and frequently tip off the police about certain crimes,
while in other communities, people try to minimize interaction with law enforcement officials and might require additional, economic incentives to use incriminating information they might have. Thus, empirical data about the culture and
reporting behaviors of an identified community could help guide a legislature in
defining the range of crimes covered by the statute.
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subject to blackmail would be engaged in activity the legislature
wished to deter, and that these criminals might be deterred by
increasing their potential costs through blackmail.
For example, if drug traffickers within the jurisdiction tend as
a group to be extremely violent, the legislature might not want to
give people an incentive to blackmail this group of criminals. The
legislature might fear the social costs of increased violence in
response to blackmail proposals. In addition, the legislature might
determine that increasing the costs of drug dealing is unlikely to
deter people from entering the industry. The increased costs
imposed might not outweigh the economic rents collected by drug
dealers, who generally face inelastic demand curves and have
13
relatively low opportunity costs.
On the other hand, people engaged in embezzlement, bank
fraud, or other white collar crimes might be unlikely to react
violently to a blackmail proposal, so that allowing blackmail would
not impose as many social costs in the form of increased violence.
Certain kinds of crime might be detected more easily and more
cheaply by watchful private citizens than by public officials.
Embezzlement, for example, could be detected by a careful client,

supervisor, or co-worker despite the embezzler's attempts to conceal
the crime from public authorities. White collar criminals also might

be more likely than most criminals to calculate the potential costs
of their contemplated crime ex ante, making the possibility of
blackmail an effective deterrent. Moreover, because many business

and banking industries are subject to government regulation, people
likely to engage in criminal activity could be easily informed that
they could be subject to blackmail if they were to violate particular
laws. Allowing blackmail of these criminals, then, might increase
the criminals' perceived potential costs without imposing heavy
social costs.

The wisdom of this affirmative defense rests upon an assumption that blackmail of criminals might be a productive activity, and
it is to this assertion that we now turn.

is See A. Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the
Possible Convergence of Rational Theoy and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725,
757-76 (1989) (presenting an economic analysis of the market for cocaine, including elasticity of demand and deterrence effects from criminal penalties).
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II. THE DETERRENCE VALUE OF BLACKMAIL
A. An Economic Model of Deterrence
Economists argue that optimal penalties can deter criminal
activity.1 4 They assert that an important purpose of criminal
sanctions is to make the expected cost of criminal activity exceed its
expected benefit to the criminal. 1 5 Some economists argue that
14 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 515-32 (1988)
(concluding that increasing the probability or severity of penalty will reduce
crime); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-86
(2d ed. 1989) (discussing the relationship between penalty, enforcement, and risk

questions); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-31 (4th ed. 1992)

[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (discussing optimal criminal sanctions).
But see Posner supra note 3, at 1822 ("Punishment is rarely optimal in any strong
sense."). Certainly, the proposition that crime can be optimally deterred through
heavy penalties is not uncontroversial. The causes of crime are many, and
increasing penalties will probably not deter crimes that stem from some of these
causes. Moreover, deterrence does not appear to be the only or even the primary
purpose of the criminal law. For example, the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines encourage judges to consider the purposes of punishment when meting
out sentences, and deterrence is only one of several purposes mentioned:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider(2) The need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner ....
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
15 See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 14, at 224 ("[T]he criminal
sanction ought to be so contrived that the criminal is made worse off by committing the act."). For example, if a person who is risk-neutral is considering stealing
an object worth $1000, one might think that the prospect of making restitution to
the victim (giving the object back to the victim or paying the victim $1000) plus
perhaps an additional fine of $1 would be enough to deter the person from
stealing, because the expected costs ($1001) are greater than the benefits from
stealing. But if the probability of detection and conviction is less than one, as it
almost certainly is with burglaries, the expected cost of the crime to the would-be
burglar is less than $1000. If, for example, there is only a one in five chance that
the burglar will be caught and punished, the expected cost of the crime is only
$200.20 or ($1001)*(.2). In order to raise the expected costs of the crime above
the expected benefits, the government must increase the penalty, the probability
of conviction, or both. If the government is unwilling to increase the probability
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a rational system of law enforcement will try to achieve the optimal
level of deterrence with the minimum expenditure of resources on
law enforcement. 16 When fewer resources are spent on enforcement, the probability of detection and conviction decreases and the
state must raise criminal penalties in order to maintain deterrence.
Some empirical work, however, suggests that "certainty of punishment rather than severity of punishment is the key to deterring
criminal behavior." 17 This may be because people calculate the
expected costs of events less accurately as the probability of those
events decreases. 18 People might calculate the costs of crime
inaccurately if the probability of detection is very small and the
government relies on a very heavy penalty to maintain high costs of
criminal activity. If people underestimate the costs of the criminal
activity, they could be insufficiently deterred. 19

of detection and conviction by spending more resources on law enforcement, it
must increase the burglar's penalty to $5005 in order to keep the expected cost of
crime above the expected benefits ($5005)*(.2) = $1001, which is greater than
$1000. Although this economic model may seem to overestimate the extent to
which potential criminals consider the costs of their activity, empirical studies have
shown that criminals respond to changes in the probability of apprehension,
severity of punishment, and other costs, such as opportunity costs. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 14, at 524-28; DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING
THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1978); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 14, at 224 n.1; Alfred
Blumstein & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion,
29 STAN. L. REV. 241 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 559-61 (1973).
16 See e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (setting up mathematic equations to analyze the variable
costs of reducing crime to an optimal level).
17 Blumstein & Nagin, supra note 15, at 243 & n.8 (1977); see also Johannes
Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949,
962 (1966) (discussing the great rise in burglary in Denmark when the Germans
began arresting Danish police in 1944).
18 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, DECISION RESEARCH, PROSPECT
THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK 3-2 (1977) (Technical

Report PTR-1042-77-4) (discussing overweighting of probabilities and attitudes
towards uncertainty that may lead to increases in decision-makers' risk aversion
where loss may be substantial); see also RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN
INFERENCE:

STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS

OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 165 (1980)

(stating that people underestimate the risk of uncertain negative consequences);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1126 (1974) (describing how available information is
used, so even if probability is low, heavily publicized arrests would deter crime).
19 SeeJohnJ. Donahue III& Ian Ayres, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About
the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791, 800 n.43 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986)) (stating that a law and
economics model of deterrence that preserves society's resources by heavily
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Thus, if government spends few resources on law enforcement
pursuant to a theory that optimal deterrence will be achieved
through very high fines, people may be insufficiently deterred
because they may underestimate the probability of the fines being
imposed. Increasing enforcement activity might bring the probability of detection to a high enough level that people would once again
accurately assess the costs of criminal activity. 20 Other policy
considerations also support increasing the probability of detection
and conviction. Noncriminals as well as criminals may generally feel
a greater respect for the law when they see it enforced more
frequently, regardless of the severity of the punishment. 21 Moreover, a person whose criminal activity is detected and punished
when it remains at a less serious level may be specifically deterred
from committing more serious crimes that impose greater social
costs. Increasing the probability of detecting less serious crimes
may prevent more serious criminal activity by the same people in
the future.
B. Blackmail as a Mechanism of CriminalLaw Enforcement
Anyone who believes in optimal penalties capable of deterring
all inefficient crimes would probably reject the notion that allowing
blackmail might improve deterrence. Once we recognize that a
government might feel constrained in setting fines or penalties,
however, 22 we start to see a role for incriminating blackmail.
punishing fewer criminals conflicts with social science, because social scientists
believe "decisionmakers appear to underestimate systematically the risk of
uncertain negative consequences" and would be deterred more effectively by an
increased likelihood of punishment).
20 See Thorsten Sellin, The Law and Some Aspects of CriminalConduct, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 113, 119-20 (Greenwood Press
1969) (1957) (discussing sharp drops in crime rates in one New York precinct
when the city tripled the number of police officers assigned to the area); Kenneth
I. Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales,
1894-1967, 86 J. POL. ECON. 815, 823-33 (1978) (analyzing how changes in the
probability of being punished affect crime rates).
21 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
96 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975) ("Nothing so weakens the machinery of the
law than the hope of going unpunished; how could one establish in the minds of
the public a strict link between the offense and a penalty if it were affected by a
certain coefficient of improbability?"); see also Donahue & Ayres, supra note 19, at
800 n.43 (contrasting Posner's view of deterrence with that of Cesare Beccaria).
For further discussion of the benefits from public declaration of criminal conduct
and its consequences, see infra part LB.
2 The state might keep official fines for a given offense below the optimal
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Allowing incriminating blackmail could effectively increase levels of
law enforcement activity and raise the potential criminal's expected
costs. 23 Through blackmail, people could benefit from information about another's criminal activity, and thus gain an incentive to
investigate crimes. Increased investigation could raise the likelihood that crimes would be detected and costs imposed on the
criminals. Even when based on casually acquired information,
incriminating blackmail could increase deterrence.
Four hypothetical jurisdictions with different rules demonstrate
the possible deterrence value of allowing incriminating blackmail:
24
imposes a duty to report criminal activity
JURISDICTION A:
and blackmail is allowed;
JURISDICIGON

B:

imposes a duty to report criminal activity and
blackmail is prohibited;

JURISDICTION C:

imposes no duty to report criminal activity

and blackmail is allowed;
JURISDICTION D:

imposes no duty to report criminal activity

and blackmail is prohibited (the law in U.S.
jurisdictions).

If a jurisdiction imposes a duty to report crime, as in Jurisdiction A, legalizing blackmail may have no effect on deterrence.

In

level in order to preserve some marginal deterrence or because of constitutional
constraints.
23 See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 42-43 (noting that the price paid to the
blackmailer is keyed to the victim's ability to pay and not to the cost of punishment); Posner, supra note 3, at 1821 (stating that in a situation where a victim has
been duly punished, the only effect of blackmail would be to increase the punishment by the amount of the blackmail payment).
24 Professor Feinberg argues that this is or has been the state of the law in
common law jurisdictions, as states enforced "misprision of felony" and "compounding" statutes. These laws prohibited the failure to report the commission of
a crime and the "settling... of a claim that was really the state's to make, since it
involved criminal, not merely civil, violations." FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 243-44.
For a modern-day application of similar concepts to a small community of lawyers
in Illinois, see In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Ill. 1988) (subjecting a
lawyer to discipline for failure to report the ethical misconduct of another lawyer).
Feinberg argues further that even in the absence of a legal duty to report crimes, a
"civic duty" requires people to "cooperate with law enforcement," and the illegality
of blackmail prevents people from profiting from violations of this "duty of
citizenship." FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 244-45. For additional discussion of crime
reporting, see infra note 27; see also George P. Fletcher, Blackmai: the Paradigmatic

Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617 (1993).
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such a place, blackmail would be illegal not per se but because it
requires the blackmailer to violate the reporting law. Any activity
that would constitute blackmail would already be outlawed as
attempting or offering to violate the duty to report criminal activity.
In Jurisdiction A, then, allowing blackmail would be inherently
inconsistent with the reporting law, and strict enforcement of the
reporting law would give citizens an incentive to impose costs on
criminals through public rather than private means. Blackmail
activity would not increase deterrence above the level achievable by
imposing a duty to report. Even if blackmail were technically legal,
people would not invest resources in gathering information that
could be used to blackmail others, because any attempt to blackmail
would itself be subject to criminal sanction under the reporting law.
People would have less incentive to gain the information because
they would be required to disclose it to the government, with no
possibility for private gain. In effect, Jurisdiction A would achieve
the same level of deterrence as Jurisdiction B. In Jurisdiction B, as
in Jurisdiction A, most people would have an incentive to report
criminal behavior simply to avoid breaking the law. Because
Jurisdiction B prohibits blackmail, people would probably not invest
resources to gather incriminating information. Therefore, most
information turned over to police would be casually rather than
25
deliberately acquired.
Because Jurisdiction C imposes no duty to report crime, some
of the casually acquired information that would otherwise be
reported. in Jurisdictions A and B could be lost by the government.
Because Jurisdiction C allows blackmail, however, it enables people
to capitalize on incriminating information and might induce some
of the nonreporters to blackmail criminals. Thus, some of the
casually acquired information lost to the government inJurisdiction
C might nonetheless be used to impose costs on criminals. Without
a duty to report, Jurisdiction C cannot ensure that all casually
acquired information about criminal activity will still be disclosed.
Nevertheless, it could recapture some of the value of casually
acquired information through blackmail practiced by some of the
25 Of course, some people may have independent incentives to discover
criminal behavior and may engage in some investigation to serve their own
interests. Other people may feel an altruistic urge to eradicate crime in their
neighborhoods and communities. Levels of such private investigative activity
would presumably be lower, however, than they would be in jurisdictions that also
provide economic incentives to investigators.
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citizens who choose not to report. Moreover, in ajurisdiction such
as C where blackmail is allowed, people might have an incentive to
gather incriminating information. The amount of socially useful
information about crime could increase if people undertake
investigative activities and, when they discover a criminal, impose
costs on the wrongdoer in the form of blackmail.
Further, in a jurisdiction where blackmail is allowed, some
blackmailers might have an incentive to disclose crimes to the
government when criminals refuse to pay the demanded blackmail.
They might disclose in order to preserve a reputation as blackmailers who make good on threats. 26 Future blackmail threats will be
more credible if blackmailers report crimes when blackmailees
refuse to pay. Blackmailers might also turn in the criminals they
unsuccessfully blackmail more readily if they have no fear of facing
criminal charges themselves. Thus, allowing blackmail need not
mean that casually or deliberately acquired information about crime
will be lost to the government completely. If some blackmailers
have information that they would not have disclosed to the state in
the absence of a reporting requirement, but are willing to disclose
simply to preserve credibility for future blackmailing, legalizing
blackmail could actually increase the disclosure of casually acquired
information.
If blackmailers turn over deliberately acquired
information to authorities in order to make good on a threat, the
government gains information that people would not have an
incentive to produce (much less disclose) in jurisdictions where
blackmail is illegal.
In sum, it appears that allowing blackmail might increase
deterrence.
How does the deterrence achieved by allowing
blackmail compare to deterrence levels where blackmail is illegal?
In Jurisdiction D, which would outlaw blackmail but not impose a
reporting requirement, the state might achieve the least deterrence
of all. Some people with casually acquired information might
remain silent because the jurisdiction imposes no legal duty to
report crime. 2 7 Thus, some casually acquired information could
2' This reputational concern could be particularly important to repeat players
who blackmail more than once, such as Richard Epstein's imagined "Blackmail,
Inc." See Epstein, infra note 32.
27 Some people may feel a moral duty to report, but that duty is not enforced
in our current system. It is difficult to measure the extent to which people
disregard that moral duty and fail to disclose crimes they know about. Much of
police investigative work may proceed on tips by informants and accounts by
victims and witnesses, but it is probably also true that many crimes go unreported
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be lost. And unlike Jurisdiction C, which may get some deterrence
value from these nonreporters when they commit blackmail,
Jurisdiction D could lose any enforcement benefits from the nonreporters of casually acquired information.
Moreover, in a
jurisdiction where blackmail is illegal, most people would lack
monetary incentives to acquire incriminating information. Thus,
Jurisdiction D would lose some of the deliberately acquired
information that might enhance deterrence in Jurisdiction C.
Legal rules permitting or prohibiting blackmail 28 could have
and such investigations are never even begun. Statistics compiled by the National
Bureau of Justice Statistics in 1992 show that fewer than 40% of all criminal
"victimizations" are reported to the police. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at
102 (1992); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1991, at 199 (Hindelang Criminal Justice
Research Ctr. ed., 1992) (presenting results of a poll by the Roper Organization:
When asked, "[i]f you knew someone was cheating on his income tax, would you
be likely to report it to the tax authorities or stay out of it?" 70% of the respondents said that they would "stay out of it." Similarly, when asked whether they
would report a co-worker's theft of merchandise from a store to the management,
only 60% said that they were "likely to report it.").
28 The following matrix summarizes the combined effects of rules pertaining to
blackmail and crime reportingFIGURE I

Blackmail allowed

Duty to
Dut
report

Blackmail prohibited

Legalized blackmail is
irrelevant. Duty to re-

Must report all casually acquired informa-

Effect on

port creates deterrence
because criminal must
assess probability that

tion-should see same
deterrence level as in
A.

casually
uir
acquired

No incentive to gain

No incentive to gain

Effect on

information because it

information-same as

deliberately

must be reported.

A.

acquired

another will report.

information
A

B
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the most pronounced effect on incentives to acquire information
deliberately, at some expense of time, energy, or other resources by
the blackmailer. A jurisdiction that forbids blackmail creates fewer
incentives for people to become informed about criminal activity
than does a jurisdiction where blackmail is legal. This could
decrease the probability of detection by private as well as public
authorities, and, in turn, lower deterrence.
One response to the "best case" for blackmail is that a system of
bounties will more effectively create incentives to collect incriminating information without imposing some of the potential social costs
of blackmail.29 It is possible, however, that blackmail might be
more efficient than bounties. Bounties impose transaction costs
when the state serves as middle person-paying a bounty to the
informant and then collecting a fine from the criminal once convicted.30 Blackmail would not impose this sort of transaction cost

C

No
duty to
report

D

In absence of a duty to
report, people with casually acquired information
may remain silent, thereby reducing deterrence.
Some nonreporters may
use their casually acquired information to
blackmail, however, imposing some costs on
criminals, thereby contributing to deterrence.

May get higher reporting level of casually
acquired information
than in C, because
there is no incentive
to use information privately.

Creates incentives for
people to deliberately
acquire information for
use in blackmail, and
could make up for some
loss of casually acquired
information.

No incentive to gain
information, so some
Effect on
deterrence from delib- deliberately
erately acquired infor-acquired
mation is lost.
information

Effect on
casually
acquired
information

29 See Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality:
Blachmai4 Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1901 (1993) (suggesting
that the optimal way to increase the probability of punishment is a system of
bounties which would encourage people to acquire and report information about
crimes).
30 It is not clear, of course, that the state would be able to extract a fine from a
criminal ex post in the same way that a blackmailer could extract payment from a
criminal ex ante. The costs of trial, attorney fees, etc., might deplete the criminal's resources so that the state could not reimburse itself for the bounty it paid-
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because the blackmailer could collect directly from the offender.
More importantly, bounties might not be as effective as blackmail
in stimulating production and use of deliberately acquired information. If people fail to report crime because they do not want to deal
with law enforcement authorities, they are not necessarily more
likely to want to deal with officials when a bounty is offered.
Blackmail gives these nonreporters financial incentive to acquire
and use incriminating information without the disincentive of
dealing with authorities. In addition, in a system of bounties the
state must determine the criterion for payment, and the would-be
informant must calculate the probability of meeting that criterionwhether it is apprehension, arrest, or conviction. If conditions are
placed on the payment, particularly conditions that are outside of
the informant's control, the informant must discount the payoff
from deliberately acquiring the incriminating information according
to the probability of payment. As that probability decreases, a
potential bounty hunter may be less likely to invest the time and
money to develop the information.
Finally, assertions about the benefits of bounties may be easier
to test than claims about the deterrence benefits of blackmail.
Some jurisdictions or divisions of law enforcement do offer rewards
or bounties. Have they affected the amount of crime that is
reported?
Thus, it appears that allowing blackmail of criminals could
increase the probability that information about crime will be
discovered and used to raise potential criminals' costs. In this way,
incriminating blackmail could be a productive activity that might
withstand the concerns of scholars who press for continued
criminalization.

again imposing additional costs on the state. On the other hand, the state might
be a better collection agent than the blackmailer; the state would probably have to
do less negotiating with the criminal than the blackmailer would, and the state has
superior enforcement tools. To improve the blackmailer's enforcement capability,
the state could recognize a right of action to enforce the blackmail agreement, but
this goes considerably further than the affirmative defense discussed in this
Article. Without such a right of enforcement, of course, the blackmailer's only
recourse is to report the crimes of blackmailees who breach the agreement and
refuse to pay.
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III. THE DANGERS OF BLACKMAIL

Legal scholars and philosophers have adopted two major lines
of analysis about blackmail. Moral theorists examine the parts and
structure of the blackmail transaction to identify some element that
gives rise to criminality. The economic approach, on the other
hand, is more physiological. By predicting the consequences of
decriminalizing blackmail, these scholars attempt to identify the
31
basis for continued criminal prohibitions of blackmail.
3
A. Economic Inefficiency of Blackmail

2

Some scholars argue that the illegality of blackmail gives people
a disincentive to engage in socially undesirable or wasteful behavior.

31 Jeffrie G. Murphy has described this dichotomy in another useful way. He
contrasts a condemnation of blackmail based on "deontological moral principles"
with one based on "teleological considerations of social policy-e.g., considerations
of utility." Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquity, 63 MONIST 156,
162-63 (1980).

32 Blackmail could be economically inefficient simply because it involves
coercion of the blackmailee. If one of the parties to the blackmail transaction
could be said to be acting involuntarily, the assumption that voluntary transactions
are wealth maximizing would render the blackmail transaction nonmaximizing and
thus inefficient. David Owens questions the voluntariness of blackmail because he
doubts that the blackmailee's agreement can be sufficiently well informed to be
rational. See David Owens, Should Blackmail be Banned?, 63 PHIL. 501, 509 (1988)
("[The blackmail victim] cannot be certain how many blackmail contracts they will
have to strike or how much they will have to pay out to each blackmailer."); see also
Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675
(1988) ("The victim is also likely to be uncertain about the blackmailer's real
intentions."). Although Owens argues convincingly that substantial uncertainty
infuses the blackmail transaction, he cannot explain why it is necessarily irrational
for a criminal to pay off a blackmailer and avoid detection by authorities. As
many commentators have pointed out, the blackmailee often consents to and even
welcomes the chance to pay off a potential informer. See e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 558 (1983) ("[I]f one person does not have
the right to threaten actions ... , he has to act without giving warning. This in
turn will work to the disadvantage of the other party, who is now deprived of the
choice that the threat would have otherwise given him."); Murphy, supra note 31,
at 159 ("[I]n many cases the person being blackmailed is willing to pay the asked
price, and far prefers paying the price to having the blackmailer expose him. .. ").
That the blackmailee may be faced with a hard choice between the consequences
of disclosure and paying the blackmailer does not necessarily make the blackmail
any more coercive than the choice facing many parties to wholly legitimate
economic transactions. See Lindgren, supra note 3, at 701 & n.162 ("Even highly
coercive threats are present in many types of legitimate economic bargaining.");
Murphy, supra note 31, at 157 (stating that blackmail draws intoquestion "the
morality of a whole range of economic transactions"). For a discussion of coercion
in blackmail from a moral rather than an economic perspective, see generally Scott
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Ronald Coase, for example, has suggested that blackmail is illegal
because it causes a wasteful expenditure of resources by the
blackmailer. 3 3 The blackmailer spends time and money to uncover
information only to suppress it once the blackmailee makes the
payoff. In Coase's view, this transaction produces nothing of value:
"[I]t is obviously undesirable that resources should be devoted to
bargaining which produces a situation no better than it was
previously."34 Outlawing blackmail prevents or at least reduces
this inefficient allocation of resources.
Professor Lindgren criticizes Coase's theory for failing to explain
why blackmail should be illegal when the blackmailer acquires the
information casually and therefore expends no resources in
gathering the information.3 5 In these cases, the only costs are the6
3
transaction costs involved in negotiating with the blackmailee
As Lindgren points out, these costs are not necessarily wasteful,
because the blackmailer and criminal will reach agreement in those
negotiations only if each expects a net gain "large enough to offset
the transaction costs of bargaining."3 7 In short, Lindgren accepts
the power of Coase's theory to explain the illegality of blackmail
based on information that is deliberately acquired, but argues that
the costs of blackmail based on casually acquired information might
be outweighed by a net private gain enjoyed by the parties to the
blackmail transaction, and that Coase's attempt to base the illegality
of blackmail on some "inefficiency" or "waste" inherent in the
transaction is not persuasive. 8
Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640-43 (1993).
33 See Coase, supra note 32, at 674 ("Blackmail involves the expenditure of
resources in the collection of information which, on payment of blackmail, will be
suppressed. It would be better if this information were not collected and the
resources were used to produce something of value."); see also Ginsburg &
Shechtman, supra note 4, at 1860 ("No rational economic planner would tolerate
the existence of an industry dedicated to digging up dirt at real resource cost, and
then reburying it."); Shavell, supra note 29, at 1894 ("[E]ffort expended by

threateners is a social waste .... Similarly, precautions taken by potential victims
avoiding threats reduce social welfare.").
3
Coase, supra note 32, at 671.
3
5 See James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36
UCLA L. REV. 597, 601 (1989) ("The problem with the Coase-Ginsburg approach

is that it is unable to explain why it is blackmail to sell information that is not
purposefully
acquired.").
- 6 See Coase, supra note 32, at 674 (stating that even when acquiring information requires no resources, "resources would certainly be employed in the blackmailing transaction").

37 Lindgren, supra note 35, at 602.
38 See id. ("[T]he mere expenditure of resources does not render the bargain
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Coase's theory fails to explain the illegality of blackmail not only
when it is based on casually acquired information, but also when it
is based on deliberately acquired information. Coase may be
incorrect when he assumes that the blackmail transaction is not
productive. The blackmail transaction, or perhaps more accurately
the fact that such a transaction is permitted, may produce a social
good-deterrence.39 When the blackmail is based on incriminating
information, it may augment the potential costs of criminal activity
and deter crime, thereby increasing social welfare. 4° The resources spent on discovering the blackmailee's criminal activity and
negotiating with the criminal about the blackmail are not wasted if
the social benefits from deterrence outweigh the costs of achieving
it. But the word "deterrence" never appears in Coase's article, and
he fails to consider the positive externalities that the blackmail
transaction (or the potential for it) might produce. Coase incorrectly assumes that the resources spent on blackmail could be put to
better use in all cases.
The conduct Coase deems most wasteful-blackmail based on
deliberately acquired information-is the sort of activity most likely
to add substantially to the costs of crime. When blackmail is illegal
and people casually acquire information about criminal activity,
some of the time (due to civic virtue, malice toward the criminal, or
fear for their own security, etc.) people will disclose the crime to the
authorities. Some of the deterrence achievable through blackmail

wasteful.").
39 Professors Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen have drawn a useful distinction
between "productive facts" ("information that can be used to increase wealth") and
.redistributive facts" ("information creating a bargaining advantage that can be
used to redistribute wealth in favor of the knowledgeable party but that does not
lead to the creation of new wealth"). COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 259.
Although the law might efficiently create incentives for discovery of productive
facts by compensating the discoverer, efficiency does not require compensation of
those who discover redistributive facts. Furthermore, "allowing the discoverers of
redistributive facts to use them to transfer wealth to themselves induces defensive
expenditures on the part of parties seeking to avoid losing their wealth to more
knowledgeable people, and these defensive expenditures are wasteful from a social
viewpoint." Id. To the extent that people know that their criminal activity is
subject to the costs of lawful blackmail, their activity is deterred, thus yielding
blackmail that could be characterized as a "productive fact" and making it efficient
to create incentives for its discovery.
40 There are exceptions to this assertion, of course. Some crime may benefit
the criminal more than it harms anyone else. Reduction of such crimes would not
necessarily increase social welfare.
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based on casually acquired information, therefore, could also be
captured in a regime where blackmail is illegal. The potential
deterrence from blackmail based on deliberately acquired information, on the other hand, might be lost entirely in a jurisdiction
where blackmail is illegal. The expenditure of resources on
investigation and negotiation, 41 so wasteful in Coase's view, might
not occur at all, because the criminalization of blackmail will reduce
incentives to undertake such activity.
William Landes and Richard Posner would approve of such a
result. They argue that a public monopoly on law enforcement
leads to the optimal level of criminal law enforcement activity.
Allowing blackmail, they say, would allow private enforcement of
the law to compete with and effectively undermine the public
42
monopoly on criminal law enforcement.
Landes and Posner warn that blackmail could undercut public
enforcement in ways that would lead to an underdeterrence of
crime. The blackmailer might impose less than the optimal penalty
on the criminal when the criminal is unable to pay the optimal
penalty. In such circumstances, the state can incarcerate the
offender to exact punishment, but the blackmailer can impose only
monetary sanctions on the criminal. If "the blackmailer [sells] his
incriminating information to the offender for a price lower than the
statutory cost of punishment to the criminal, [the blackmail] would
reduce the effective cost of punishment to the criminal below the
43
level set by the legislature."
Landes's and Posner's underenforcement theory seems to rest
on three assumptions: 1) criminals have inadequate resources to
41 Granted, creating incentives to gain information for use in blackmail could
impose social costs in the form of increased privacy invasions. Rewards or
bounties for information about criminals might also encourage privacy violations,
and yet bounties are not condemned for imposing heavy social costs. Such social
costs may outweigh the deterrence benefits of blackmail, but this empirical point is
different from Coase's assertion that blackmail produces nothing of value.
Moreover, if the legislature considered the potential for privacy invasions when
deciding which crimes to include in the affirmative defense, they might encourage
incriminating blackmail only in contexts where privacy invasions are not likely to
occur or be harmful. For additional comparison of bounties and blackmail, see
Shavell, supra note 29, at 1901; see also supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
42 See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 42-43 ("Were blackmail a form of
private enforcement, lawful, the public monopoly of enforcement would be
undermined.").

43 Id. at 42.
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pay the blackmailer an appropriate fine, 2) blackmail is based only
on casually acquired information, and 3) the casually acquired
information that is used in blackmail would be turned over to the
authorities if the blackmail did not occur. If any of these assumptions is suspended, the underenforcement thesis is weakened.
If the blackmailee is not poor and can afford the appropriate
blackmail payment, then incarceration might not be necessary to
deter. According to Landes and Posner, deterrence will be
achievable by exacting the optimal penalty from criminals who have
the means to pay. The deterrence stems from the fact that the
criminal parts with the money, not that the state (as opposed to a
private agent) collects it. Thus, when the criminal does not suffer
significant wealth constraints, the underdeterrence Landes and
Posner fear is not likely to occur. Even if the offender is too poor
to pay the blackmailer the monetary equivalent of the incarceration
he faces at the hands of public enforcers, any blackmail payment he
can afford could simply supplement public enforcement. The state
can still incarcerate the offender if he is apprehended.
If the information was deliberately rather than casually acquired,
the blackmailer has added to the criminal's probability of being
caught, and this increased probability of private detection may
outweigh the slight drop in the probability of public detection due
to the loss of the blackmailer as an informant to police. But has the
government really lost the blackmailer as an informant? If the
optimal fine has been set according to a probability of detection
that assumes only the government is deliberately acquiring information, the blackmailer may increase that probability of detection by
also deliberately acquiring information about the crime. The
government can conduct its ordinary investigative activities; the
blackmailer merely undertakes an additional to acquire information
the government would not expect to get from the blackmailer
44
anyway.
Even if the blackmailer uses casually acquired information, the
blackmail decreases the state's probability of apprehending and
imprisoning the criminal only if the blackmailer would have
disclosed the information to authorities if blackmail were illegal. If
44 If law enforcement authorities pay bounties to people who report crimes,
they may assume that some deliberately acquired information will come from the
public. If punishment is set based on probabilities of detection that depend upon

"bounty hunters," then the blackmailer might decrease the probability of public
detection.
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the blackmailer is exploiting casually acquired information that
would not have been disclosed to authorities even if blackmail were
illegal,4 5 the blackmailer is increasing the criminal's costs without
decreasing the probability of public apprehension and enforcement.
Even if some blackmail is based on casually acquired information
that would have been reported to officials if blackmail were illegal,
the resulting decrease in the probability of public detection might
still be outweighed by the increased probability of private detection
and punishment by private blackmailers with casually and deliberately acquired information.
Discounted blackmail payments will cause underdeterrence,
then, only if together with public enforcement they cause the total
costs imposed on criminals to decrease. Granted, legalizing
incriminating blackmail will allow some individuals to profit from
casually acquired information that they would have disclosed to the
police if blackmail were illegal. This does not mean, however, that
total deterrence will decrease. Those blackmailers might extract
close to the optimal penalty from blackmailees who can afford it.
Even if the blackmailers reduce the blackmail payment to account
for the blackmailee's limited means, the loss in deterrence from this
sort of blackmail might be outweighed by deterrence gains from
blackmail by people with deliberately acquired information, or
casually acquired information that would not be turned over to
police if blackmail were illegal.
In addition to their underdeterrence hypothesis, Landes and
Posner argue that blackmail could lead to overenforcement under
two sets of circumstances. First, they fear that a private enforcer
would not exercise discretionary nonenforcement that is typical of
public prosecutors and law enforcers. 46 Second, criminals may
overpay by giving the blackmailer something close to the optimal
fine even though they remain subject to public law enforcement.
Landes and Posner argue that public prosecutors would decline
to prosecute cases that technically fall within a statute's prohibitions
but do not create the social evils contemplated by the statute. Laws
may be written broadly only because more tailored statutes would
not be costjustified. With such statutes, the legislature relies on the
45 This category of information may be rather large. See supra note 27.
46 See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 38-39 ("Our analysis of private
enforcement is relevant to the question [of discretionary nonenforcement] since it
is clear that enforcer nullification would not be a feature of private enforcement:
all laws would be enforced that yielded a positive expected net return.").
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people responsible for implementation to exercise some discretion
in the enforcement of the law.4 7 Landes and Posner fear that
private law enforcers would have an incentive to enforce laws
whenever possible, lacking the insightful restraint of public
48
enforcers.
Landes's and Posner's fear of overenforcement of the law fails
to account for the extent to which the probability of prosecution
can affect the blackmailer's demand. Consider a case in which a)
the prosecutor can only learn about the crime from the blackmailer; 49 b) the probability that an informed prosecutor will proceed
against a criminal is only fifty percent; and c) if prosecuted, the
criminal will face a fine of $100,000. Will the blackmailer overcharge the criminal who commits a crime subject to prosecutorial
discretion? To answer this, we should consider how much a
blackmailer would be able to extract from a criminal if the blackmailer learns about the violation and attempts blackmail.
Suppose that C has committed a crime and B learns about it,
either by chance or through some effort. B then approaches C and
proposes the blackmail amount b*, to prevent disclosure. 50 C will
47 Decriminalizing blackmail in the manner considered in this Article would
not necessarily trigger Landes's and Posner's fears of overenforcement. The
legislature could specify the classes of criminals that it will permit to be blackmailed. This sort of specificity by the legislature would prevent situations from
arising in which a blackmailer would inappropriately override a declination policy
of a local prosecutor. If the blackmailer is blackmailing a criminal engaged in a
crime covered by the affirmative defense, the legislature has already made clear its
desire to deter that crime and has, in effect, overruled the prosecutor's informal
declination policy, as legislatures often do. When legislatures specifically earmark
funds for increased enforcement of drug laws, for example, they may effectively
override prosecutors' informal policies of relaxed enforcement. A prosecutor
would not necessarily object to circumvention of his or her declination policies
through blackmail. The prosecutor might be declining to prosecute certain kinds
of violations in order to preserve public resources, and not as a signal that those
violations are condoned. Because blackmail would consume resources of the
criminal, not the state, it would not undermine a declination policy based on fiscal
conservation. Granted, this argument does not completely answer Landes's and
Posner's concern about declination policies; rather, it shows that it may be possible
from an operational perspective to get some of blackmail's benefits without the
overdeterrence
cost that Landes and Posner anticipate.
48
See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 38-39.
49 Prosecutors might have an independent probability to discover the crime
without affecting this analysis.
50 Here we suppose that B has all the bargaining power and is therefore able to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Under alternative assumptions about bargaining
power, the blackmail amount would be even lower, indicating that Landes's and
Posner's concern with overdeterrence is even more misplaced.
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either accept or reject B's proposal. If C accepts, the two will come
to agreement and the negotiation will end: C, the blackmailee, will
lose b*, the value of the blackmail payment, and the blackmailer will
gain b*.5 1 If C rejects the blackmail transaction, B will disclose the
violation to P, the prosecutor, who will prosecute 50% of the time.
If P does not prosecute, the events will come to a close without
payoffs to either party. If C is prosecuted and punished, the payoff
will be a negative one for C. C will lose $100,000 and the blackmailer will gain nothing.
C's strategy for accepting or rejecting the blackmail transaction
will turn upon C's comparison of the payoffs from each alternative
course of action. Since C's expected payoff from rejecting is
$50,000, C will rationally accept a blackmail transaction if and only
if B demands less than $50,000. If B knows that this is C's optimal
strategy, B will demand such an amount (e.g., $49,999). This
example shows that allowing blackmail will not necessarily overdeter
when prosecutors exercise discretion to decline prosecution of the
blackmailee's crime. In the absence of blackmail, the expected costs
of the crime to C are $50,000. Where blackmail is allowed, the
52
expected costs will be just shy of that amount (e.g., $49,999).

Landes and Posner also argue that blackmail may cause
overenforcement of the law if the blackmailee pays a blackmailer the
full fine she would expect to pay under public enforcement when
she may still be subject to further punishment by public enforcers. 53 Yet their argument again ignores the possibility that further
51 Transaction costs are assumed to be zero.
12 This order of events can be illustrated by the following game tree:
B proposes

C accepts

[-b* -b*]

blackmail

P prosecutes and convicts
___

[B]

FI
C rejects

'Z
PH" '

(.S probability)
[-100K, 0]

1

,0
[0, 0]
P declines to prosecute

(.5 probability)
Payoffs: [C (Criminal), B (Blackmailer)]
Fine = $100,000
C's expected cost of rejecting blackmail = (-$100,000)(.5) = -$50,000
5s See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 42; see also Lindgren, supra note 35, at
606 n.32 (noting that a criminal calculating how much to pay a blackmailer must
discount the amount by the probability someone else will discover the information,
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public enforcement could affect the maximum amount blackmailers
can extract from criminals. A similar game theoretic model can be
constructed to show how the possibility of future enforcement will
reduce the maximum amount that a blackmailer can charge. The
adjustability of the blackmail fee is a natural check against their
overenforcement arguments.
The legalization of blackmail,
therefore, can increase the chance that information about crime will
be produced and used to impose costs on criminals (hence,
increasing deterrence) without giving rise to concerns that blackmailers will be able to extract more than the socially optimal
amount. Blackmailers and criminals are, in a real sense, "bargaining
in the shadow of the law" 54 and are unlikely to strike deals outside
the law's penumbra.
Richard Epstein analyzes blackmail instrumentally by asking,
55
If
"what would the world look like if blackmail were legalized?"
blackmail were legal, Epstein argues, blackmailers would gain
incentives to engage in ancillary crime or fraud; blackmail has a
"necessary tendency to induce deception and other wrongs." 56
The interaction between blackmailer and criminal may not be
coercive in itself, Epstein asserts, but it will occur in a context "rife
57
with coercive and fraudulent elements."
Epstein does not seem to argue that the blackmailer is committing fraud by failing to disclose the crime. 58 Instead, he is conthat the blackmailer might ask for more money in the future, that the blackmailer
will carry out the threat even if paid, and that the blackmailer's threat is an empty
one); Owens, supra note 32, at 511-13 (arguing that blackmail should be illegal
because it is an "irrational bargain;" blackmailees lack adequate information about
whether the blackmailer will carry out the threat, whether they will be subject to
future threats, and what the amount of those future demands might be). Overenforcement of the law is an undesirable result if we assume that some crime is
efficient and should not be deterred. Mitchell Polinsky illustrates the possibility of
efficient crime with an example-double parking. In some emergency situations,
the benefits from double parking might outweigh the costs it imposes on others.
See PoLINSKY, supra note 14, at 75-76. Of course, if the legislature promulgates a
list of crimes that will be subject to blackmail, then the legislature presumably
makes a judgment that the benefits of deterring those crimes outweigh the cost
that an efficient crime might also be deterred.
5 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (discussing "negotiations
and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom").
55 Epstein, supra note 32, at 562.
5 Id. at 565.
57 Id. at 566.
58
James Lindgren says that "[t]o make any sense," Epstein's theory must be
premised on a belief that through blackmail alone, the blackmailer engages in
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cerned that the blackmail aggravates ongoing fraud by the blackmailee against a third party. The blackmailee is avoiding punishment or other sanctions from third parties by hiding the incriminating information. Epstein says that a blackmailer will facilitate the
blackmail by counseling the blackmailee about "the proper way to
arrange his affairs in order to keep the disclosures from being
made." 59 Thus the blackmailer will "participate in the very fraud"
6
the blackmailee is committing against a third party. 0
Epstein's fraud theory takes a strange turn when applied to
blackmail based on incriminating information. Any criminal eluding
public authorities could be said to be engaged in fraudulent activity,
pretending to be law-abiding when in fact she has committed a
crime. According to Epstein's theory, any criminal who fails to
surrender to police immediately would be perpetrating fraud in
addition to the actual crime. People who learn of the crime and fail
to report it could also fall into Epstein's group of fraudulent actors.
A principled distinction can be drawn, however, between passively
waiting for the state to locate a criminal and failing to cooperate
with officials candidly when approached. Indeed, this distinction
may be reflected in the law regarding obstruction of justice, which
becomes effective only after government proceedings, such as grand
61
jury investigations, have begun.
Moreover, the blackmailer's obligations under the blackmail
contract could be devised to distinguish clearly between: 1) the
blackmailer's right affirmatively to disclose the criminal's crime to
the authorities, which the blackmailer is promising not to exercise
in exchange for the blackmail payment; and 2) the blackmailer's duty
to cooperate with law enforcement officials and answer their
questions truthfully if they should become aware of the criminal's
illegal activity independent of the blackmailer. The parties could
recognize the difference between a blackmailer's forbearance from
actively seeking out authorities and disclosing the blackmailee's
crime, on the one hand, and the blackmailer's passive, reactive
cooperation with authorities should they seek her out at some point.
If the blackmailer fails to cooperate with authorities should they
immoral or criminal concealment. Lindgren, supra note 7, at 914. Epstein's actual
arguments, however, seem to focus much more on the ways a blackmailer "can"
(and thus does not necessarily) take additionalsteps to facilitate the blackmailee's
fraud of third parties.
59 Epstein, supra note 32, at 564.
60Id.

61 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1988).
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approach her, she advances beyond silence in exchange for payment
and starts to engage in affirmative concealment of the crime. The
affirmative defense of incriminating blackmail considered in this
Article does not contemplate that the blackmailer should be able to
take actions to reduce the probability of detection of the crime by
authorities, except to the extent that failure to act as an informant
in a proactive way reduces probability of detection by authorities.
The blackmail transaction could not include an agreement that
the blackmailer would thwart government investigation of the
blackmailee by affirmatively concealing the crime or refusing to
cooperate with authorities. 62 To invoke the affirmative defense
that the blackmailee was a criminal and the blackmailer was a
private law enforcer, the blackmailer would have to show that he
was reasonably certain about the blackmailee's criminal activity.
Evidence that the blackmailer expressed ignorance of the crime to
authorities or to the victim 63 in the wake of the blackmail would
demonstrate concealment, since it would directly contradict the
defendant's position in presenting the affirmative defense.
Epstein also fears that legalized blackmail will spawn additional
criminal activity by the blackmailee.
If blackmailees lack the
resources to make blackmail payments, they will be driven to illegal
activity because they will be unable to borrow money without
revealing the reason for the loan. 64 As Professor Lindgren points
out in his response to Epstein, however, we do not generally
criminalize activities simply because they are paid for with illegal
62 It is possible, of course, that unless the blackmailer promises to lie to
authorities or otherwise refuses to cooperate, criminals will be unwilling to pay
blackmail. In other words, the mere promise to forego affirmative disclosure to
the police may not generate much income for a potential blackmailer. We cannot
know at this point how the value of total silence would compare to the value of
limited silence, and how much, if anything, criminals will be willing to pay for the
latter. Such logistical problems may explain why these transactions will be rare.
They do not, however, explain why the promise to keep the more limited silence
should be illegal.
63 The blackmailer's failure to report the crime will make it more difficult for
the victim to recover from the criminal in a civil action, but this negative effect is
not enough to justify criminalizing blackmail. Under the present system, people
have no duty to report a crime to authorities; nor do they have a duty to disclose
the identity of tortfeasors to their victims. Blackmailers could remain subject to
liability for fraud if they affirmatively misrepresent what they know when asked by
the victim or the victim's representatives. In any case, the blackmail would not
necessarily decrease the victim's probability of discovering the identity of the
tortfeasor.
64 See Epstein, supra note 32, at 564.
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gains. People often commit crimes to pay for legitimate goods and
services, but that is not a rationale for criminalizing the production
of those items. 65 Moreover, even people engaged in legitimate
activities may misrepresent the reason for a loan if they are
embarrassed about the true purpose.66
Even if, as Epstein asserts, fraud against third parties is a
"precondition" of blackmail that justifies its illegality, he overlooks
the possibility that potential third parties as a group might benefit
if blackmail were legal and deterred criminal activity. The fewer
crimes that occurred, the less fraud would be necessary to conceal
the crimes. The social benefits from such deterrence might
outweigh any costs associated with the "fraud" Epstein predicts. If
the government shares the right to collect fines with blackmailers
because it predicts additional deterrence from their activity, the
concealment of crimes that have already occurred might not be
considered harmful to the government's interests, as Epstein seems
to assume it will be.
Epstein's theory of blackmail, if somewhat incomplete, nonetheless reveals a possible problem with the affirmative defense
discussed in this Article. In our zeal to deter one set of crimes, we
might create incentives to commit others. The blackmailer could
turn out to be as dangerous as the criminal with whom he transacts
business. Because actual or potential physical force is part of many
crimes, many blackmailers will have to be prepared to deal with
violent blackmailees. It might prove difficult to know when
blackmailers are merely prepared for violence and when they
initiate it.
Monitoring blackmailers' activities would be difficult, and they
might use criminal methods to operate an otherwise legitimate
business. For example, a blackmailer might approach a criminal
and threaten not only to disclose incriminating information to the
authorities unless paid, but also to harm the criminal's person or
property. The criminal is unlikely to report the illegal threat,
because she will fear detection of her criminal activity if she goes to
the authorities.
The possibility that the blackmailer will commit crimes may not
be as great a problem as it initially appears, however. The concern
65

See Lindgren, supra note 7, at 920-21.

66 See id. at 921 (noting that "if a potential defendant is borrowing to pay to
avoid an embarrassing lawsuit, he will try to conceal the real reason for the loanwhether it is a legitimate settlement or blackmail").
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about violence might be addressed by a legislative proposal that
crimes associated with violence would be excluded from the
affirmative defense. Moreover, if a blackmailer were going to
supplement threats to disclose incriminating information with
threats of violence, she would be just as likely to do so in the
present system where both threats are illegal as in a system
providing an affirmative defense of incriminating blackmail.
Indeed, if people could legitimately profit from incriminating
blackmail, they might feel an increased incentive to limit their threats
to the legal kind.6 7 Under the present system, having already
crossed the line of illegality in delivering the threat to disclose the
blackmailee's crime, the blackmailer may feel less hesitant to go
further and deliver other threats, such as threats to harm persons,
destroy property, or disclose information that is embarrassing but
68
not incriminating.
In sum, an economic analysis of blackmail raises important
questions about the costs and benefits of incriminating blackmail.
The costs of such blackmail would not clearly outweigh the
deterrence benefits, and economists who have analyzed blackmail
have failed to consider the benefits from generating and using
increased amounts of incriminating information, both casually and
deliberately acquired. If a more complete economic analysis finds
benefits that may outweigh admitted costs, then the illegality of
blackmail must find its basis in something other than strict
efficiency.

67 Indeed, the blackmailers themselves will provide some self-policing.
Knowing that the criminal activity of the blackmailee may later serve as a defense,
the blackmailers will have an incentive to keep records of the amounts paid and
the evidence on which they based their threats. They could even report their
blackmail income to the IRS and still maintain the secrecy of their income source,
much as lawyers report income from their practice generally, without submitting a
list of clients. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 563 (comparing litigation about the
blackmail contract to trade secret litigation, and noting that "the complications of
blackmail are only those endemic to any complicated commercial transaction").
But see Roe v. United States, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding
that "absent special circumstances ... disclosure of fee information and client
identity is not privileged even though it might incriminate the client"), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
6' This could be viewed as a variation on the anti-gun control slogan about
firearms: "if blackmail is criminal, only criminals will engage in blackmail."
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B. Lindgren's Structural Theory of Blackmail:
Equity and Externalities
It is blackmail's impact on third parties that most concerns
James Lindgren. In his 1984 article, Unraveling the Paradox of
Blackmail,69 Professor Lindgren offers a structural theory of
blackmail that straddles the boundary between economic and moral
theories. The "key" to explaining the criminality of blackmail, he
asserts, is its "triangular" structure. 7 The blackmail transaction
involves not only the blackmailer and the victim, but a third party
as well.7 1 In the case of blackmail involving incriminating information, the third party is the public at large or law enforcement
authorities. 72 "If the blackmail victim pays the blackmailer, it is to
avoid the harm that those others would inflict.... To get what he
wants, the blackmailer uses leverage that is less his than someone
else's. Selling the right to go to the police involves suppressing the
state's interests."78 Thus, Lindgren argues, the criminalization of
blackmail reflects "a principled decision that advantages may not be
gained by extra leverage belonging more to a third party than to the
74
threatener."
Lindgren would outlaw blackmail because it harms third parties
by compromising their rights. 75 He thus focuses on blackmail's
externalities, but overlooks the fact that those externalities could be
positive as well as negative. An economic analysis of blackmail's
costs and benefits-including these spillover effects, both positive
and negative-might not lead to the conclusion that blackmail
should be illegal.7 6 Realizing this, perhaps, Lindgren expresses his
concern for third party effects in terms of equity rather than
efficiency. Although Lindgren claims that "It]he problem is not
with anything intrinsic to the threat, or any other aspect of the
77
conduct, which may remain legitimate when taken in isolation,"
he is really objecting to the blackmailer's unjust enrichment from
69 Lindgren, supra note 3.
70
Id. at 672-73.
71 See id. at 672.
7 See id.
7 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Posner, supra note 3, at 1818 ("Economists are troubled by prohibitions
against voluntary transactions unless the transactions impose involuntary costs on
third parties."); see also supra note 32 (discussing coercion and efficiency).
76 See Lindgren, supra note 3, at 670-71.
7 Id. at 717.
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leverage that is not his to use: "[T]he blackmailer's own interest is
not sufficient to justify his using that leverage. Thus the leverage
used, while legitimate in the hands of another, is illegitimate in the
78
hands of the blackmailer."
By calling the blackmailer an "unauthorized agent for the
public," 79 Lindgren articulates in ethical terms a suggestion
Landes and Posner made in economic terms: In the case of threats
to disclose the blackmail victim's adultery, "[a] third party is not
permitted to 'blackmail' the offending spouse (unless the third party
is the victimized spouse's agent) because permitting him to enforce
the marital contract would undermine the assignment of the
exclusive right to enforce such contracts to the victim of the
breach."8 0 Lindgren couches his analysis of blackmail in terms of
the rights of the third party whose leverage is appropriated, but also
emphasizes the fact that the blackmailer is collecting undeserved
81
value through such appropriation.
Externalities to the blackmail transaction might provide good
reasons to regulate blackmail and account for the interests of
people or entities who are not parties to the negotiation. The mere
existence of externalities, however, is not a sufficient rationale for
making blackmail illegal. Externalities can be both negative and
positive. If the activity is otherwise beneficial, we should not
assume that its costs-including effects on third parties-necessarily
outweigh those benefits.
Just what are the externalities produced by the blackmail?
Lindgren asserts that in the case of threats to disclose a crime, the
blackmailer appropriates the power of the state by effectively
threatening the blackmailee with prosecution unless the demands
78 Id. Lindgren's theory could be seen as a refinement of the notion that
blackmail is illegal because the threat is wrongful. By focusing on the appropriation of leverage from a third party, Lindgren presents an expanded view of what
"the threat" entails. See id. Wrongfulness can arise as much from a sense of
inequity (leverage wrongfully gained) as from the outright illegality of the threatened act. The blackmailer may threaten to disclose information that will lead the
police to arrest the blackmailee. Included in that threat is the leverage created by
the expected harm. The leverage cannot be separated from the words of the
threat, for it is the leverage that gives the spoken words their intended weight.
When Lindgren says that the appropriation of leverage is wrongful, he is presenting a new aspect of the threat that is wrongful.
79 Id. at 715.
So Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 43.
81 See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 363 n.45 ("Even though James Lindgren gives
central importance to protecting the rights of third parties... his major emphasis
...

is on the unjust gain of the blackmailer.").
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are met. 2 The "criminal processes" invoked by the blackmailer,
however, are designed "not to settle private disputes but to protect
the interests of the public at large." 83 But what are these interests
of the public that the blackmailer compromises? Lindgren assumes
a "disjunction" between the interests of the blackmailer and the
"interests of third parties whose leverage he uses," 84 but does not
show that different interests necessarily lead to conflicting interests.
For example, Lindgren presents a hypothetical case of blackmail
in which a woman threatens to disclose that a company is criminally
violating pollution standards by using a smoke stack without
pollution control equipment. She may live near the smokestack and
suffer some damage from the pollution, for which she can seek
some compensation. 85 But if she asks for $1,000,000 to keep quiet
about the pollution and "seeks nothing for the public's benefit,"
Lindgren says, she has "clearly" committed blackmail. 86 This is
because "[t]here is an almost total disjunction between the advantage sought and the leverage used."8 7
Lindgren's mistake is to see "public benefit" only in the short
term. By failing to recognize that this woman's blackmail imposes
costs on a wrongdoer that, if allowed, might deter other polluters
because they fear similar treatment, Lindgren creates a greater
"disjunction" between the interests of the blackmailer and the
public than may actually exist. Particularly when the blackmail may
confer some social benefits of deterrence, the exchange seems fair:
the blackmailer "appropriates" the state's leverage but also creates
some deterrence value that inures to the benefit of the general
public. The public may, as Lindgren suggests, "prefer" that the
blackmailer report the polluter, 8 but they do not require it. As
explained above, 89 in the absence of a reporting requirement, the
public might benefit more from incriminating information if
blackmail is allowed.
In many cases, however, compromise of the state's claim is not
the only externality of the blackmail transaction. Sometimes the
82 See Lindgren, supra note 3, at 717 ("Selling the right to go to the police
involves suppressing the state's claim, bargaining with the state's chip.").
" Id. at 714 n.222.
84 Id. at 714.
8 See id.
86
87 Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 715.
88
See id.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
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blackmailer also appropriates the leverage of the victim of the
crime, who might have a private right of action in tort against the
blackmailee, or perhaps some right to restitution through the
criminal justice system. The blackmailer does not so clearly create
value that the victim of the crime can enjoy in exchange for the
appropriated leverage. Indeed, the blackmailer may deplete the
resources of the blackmailee so that the crime victim has a lower
probability of ever collecting restitution or tort damages from the
90
blackmail victim.
If we take seriously the notion that blackmailers might confer
social benefits by increasing the criminal's costs of crime, then we
should consider the possibility that those benefits will outweigh the
losses to individual victims who are unable to collect restitution
from a criminal defendant who, but for the blackmail payments,
would have been able to make restitution. Though some people
who are actually the victims of crimes may be unable to collect
restitution, other people who would have been victims of crime may
be spared that fate because the criminal who would have harmed
them was deterred by the specter of the increased costs of blackmail.
Lindgren's translation of economic theory to the language of
equity is powerful, if not entirely illuminating. It suggests, moreover, that where the efficiency criterion fails to explain the illegality
of incriminating blackmail, moral theory may step in to provide a
more persuasive case for the prohibition.
IV.

MORALITY ON A SYSTEMIC ScALE: AGAINST BLACKMAIL

This Article has attempted to present the best case for blackmail
by limiting it to a narrow category of behavior and tailoring rules to
maximize potential benefits from that behavior while minimizing the
costs. Even this arguably productive form of blackmail seems
wrongful, but economic theories of blackmail do not appear to
capture this element of wrongfulness. Lindgren's triangular theory
comes closer, but requires some additional moral analysis to flesh
out the theory. Unfortunately, many moral theories of blackmail
90 See Posner, supra note 3, at 1827. Knowing they are less likely to collect
restitution or damages if victimized by crime could lead people to take wasteful
precautions to prevent crimes. This effect could be countered, however, by the
increased deterrent effect of blackmail. If people know they are less likely to
become crime victims, they will feel less compelled to spend money on precautions.
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lose their force when the blackmailee is actually a lawbreaker,
because the moral theories rest upon assumptions about preexisting
rights to information, privacy, and peace that may not apply to
91
criminals.
To explain the illegality of incriminating blackmail, economic
and moral theories must be modified or enriched by a sense of the
community's collective interest in the administration of justice as a
public event that binds and defines us. We are intuitively suspicious
of private justice, and private justice is the essence of incriminating
blackmail. To discover the aspect of blackmail that justifies its
illegality, 92 then, we need to consider further the problems with
private justice generally and in the criminal context particularly.
To say that a public authority enforces the criminal law is to
state a near tautology. Many define criminal prohibitions not just
by the severity of their associated penalty, but also by the state's
exclusive entitlement to enforce them.9 3 The criminal action
91 A multitude of moral theorists have attempted to resolve the paradox of
blackmail. Several participants in this Symposium have contributed to this project.
Space constraints do not allow me to give these theories the attention they
deserve. See e.g., DebraJ. Campbell, Why Blackmail should be Criminalized: A Reply
to Walter Block and David Gordon, 21 LoY. LA. L. REv. 883, 888 (1988) (noting
that blackmail is illegal because it presents the blackmailee with a "coerced choice"
that requires the blackmailee to "choose between two things when he (the listener)
has a legitimate claim to both things"; but noting also that in the case of incriminating blackmail the state or the victim of the blackmailee's crime might legitimately extract some value from the blackmailee, casting doubt upon Campbell's
claim that the blackmailee has a "legitimate claim" to the money the blackmailer
demands); FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 241, 243 (arguing that incriminating blackmail should be illegal because it requires the blackmailer to violate a duty to
report crime; but also noting that the existence of such a duty is not at all clear);
Wendy Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (1993) (basing the illegality of blackmail on the unjustified
harm the blackmailer causes the blackmailee, and the fact that the blackmailer
uses the blackmailee as an instrument to serve only the blackmailer's own selfish
purposes; yet as this article suggests, the harm might be justified and the black-

mailees might deserve the harm they suffer if they have committed crimes);
Murphy, supra note 31, at 165 ("[W]e will not allow blackmail where the threat is
to do something that a person not only has a right to do but should do-e.g., report
crime to the police.").
92 Whether this troubling aspect is the "key" to blackmail's illegality (as
Lindgren claims for his triangular theory of blackmail, see supra text accompanying
note 70) or the basis for an "interesting distinction" between legitimate and
illegitimate activities (as Murphy claims for his theory, see supra note 31) remains
to be
seen.
9
3 See 4 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8 ("Whatever power, therefore,
individuals had of punishing offenses against the law of nature, that is now vested
in the magistrate alone, who bears the sword ofjustice by the consent of the whole
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belongs not to the victim, but to the state. Such truisms about the
nature of criminal law seem to lead inexorably to the conclusion
that it should be enforced publicly rather than privately.
Current enforcement of the criminal law, however, is not always
consistent with this emphasis on public enforcement. The "victim's
rights" movement could be viewed as an attempt to recognize the
private as well as the public interests at stake when criminal
violations occur.94 "Restorative" justice similarly emphasizes the
interests of crime victims and asserts that complete resolution of
criminal conflicts is impossible without "reconciliation" between
95
four parties: victim, offender, community and state.
Victim-offender mediation 96 is appropriately emblematic of the
movement to recognize private interests in criminal law enforcement. In many ways the debate about privatizing the criminal law
is consistent with the larger debate about alternative dispute
resolution (ADR).97 Although ADR methods are much too varied

community.").
94 See, e.g., Karyn E. Polito, The Rights of Crime Victims in the CriminalJustice
System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime? 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 241, 242 (1990) (arguing that victims of crime deserve the right of
participation in the judicial process that the Constitution guarantees to defendants).
95
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION (Burt Galaway &
Joe Hudson eds., 1990) (presenting a set of papers on restitution programming
and restorative justice); MEDIATION & CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Martin Wright & Burt
Galaway eds., 1989) (advocating victim/offender mediation); MARK UMBREIT,
CRIME & RECONCILIATION 98 (1985) (asserting that reconciliation can best be
achieved through a face-to-face meeting between victim and offender); HOWARD
ZEHR, CHANGING LENsEs 184 (1990) (describing the four basic dimensions of
harm-to the victim, to interpersonal relationships, to the offenders, and to the
community).
96 Across the United States, many jurisdictions are implementing "VictimOffender Reconciliation Programs," which use mediation between victim and
offender as a supplement to or substitute for adjudication in the criminal court.
Approximately 100 such programs currently exist or are under development. See
VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAM, VORP DIRECTORY (forthcoming
1993). In some of these programs, judges, prosecutors, or probation officers refer
cases to mediation programs for resolution and exercise little or no oversight over
the process or its results. They are a welcome relief for overburdened criminal
dockets, but serious questions remain about the value of the process for victim,
offender, and the public. Whether the programs contribute to or detract from
deterrence is a particularly vexing question, and little evidence exists regarding
recidivism rates for offender participants. But see Martin S. Rowley, Recidivism of
Juvenile Offenders in a Diversion Restitution Program in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 95, at 217, 218 (noting that there is some
evidence that successful completion of restitution by juveniles lowers recidivism
rates).
97 Alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, refers to the myriad of dispute
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to allow generalizations, they may be better suited to resolving
98
private disputes than those having obvious public ramifications.
Even civil matters may raise public issues and implicate public
interests as cases between two private entities create spill-over
effects. Cases that affect public interests may require public
involvement through the court system. Resolving these cases
privately may not satisfy the public need for oversight and input.
Several years ago Owen M. Fiss raised this concern in his article,
Against Settlement. 9 Professor Fiss complained that proponents of
ADR "treat[] settlement as the anticipation of the outcome of trial
and assume[] that the terms of settlement are simply a product of
the parties' predictions of that outcome." 10 0 According to Fiss,
a settlement that anticipates an adjudicative outcome is inferior to
actual adjudication because the settlement "is based on bargaining
and accepts inequalities of wealth as an integral and legitimate
component of the process" while adjudication "knowingly struggles
against those inequalities."1 0 1 Fiss's hostility to settlement stems
from his conception of justice, which is essentially and necessarily
public:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials.., possess a power
that has been defined and conferred by public law, not by private
agreement.... to explicate and give force to the values embodied
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to
resolution techniques that are used to facilitate or obviate adjudication in the
courts. Such methods include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, mini-trials, and
early neutral evaluation of disputes. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL.,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2d ed. 1992) (providing a "taxonomy" of dispute resolution
and background information regarding various methods). "Alternative dispute
resolution" may be a misnomer, since fewer than 10% of all cases filed actually go
to trial. See id.; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Peripheiy
Becomes the Core, 69 JUDICATURE 300, 300 (1986) (reviewing STEVEN GOLDBERG ET
AL., supra). Because any private method of dispute resolution proceeds "in the
shadow of the law," one might, however, accurately characterize such methods as
alternatives to adjudication, which underlies them all. See Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 54, at 951-52.
98 Obviously, this cannot be absolutely true. Mediation has proven to be a
constructive (and often successful) method of resolving large-scale public policy
debates, such as environmental or land use disputes. The federal government has
encouraged many of its agencies to use negotiation and mediation even as they
establish administrative rules and regulations.
9 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
100 Id. at 1076.
101 Id. at 1078.
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those values and to bring reality into accord with
102
them.
Because he believes that many civil cases require such authoritative
interpretation and declaration of public values, Fiss is unwilling to
consign any cases to private resolution.
Incriminating blackmail raises the specter of Fiss's greatest fears
about private justice. Resource disparities will affect outcomes in
blackmail powerfully. Legalized blackmail allows wealthy criminals
to prevent (or at least postpone) disclosure of their crimes by
purchasing the blackmailer's silence. Poorer criminals lack this
purchasing power, and are thus more likely to be reported,
apprehended, and imprisoned. The economic model of deterrence
outlined earlier in this Article suggests that monetary penalties and
imprisonment are fungible. Thus monetary penalties alone may be
sufficient to deter criminals who actually have money to lose, but
insufficient to deter criminals who lack resources to pay. The
theoretical differences in deterrence, however, cannot outweigh the
overwhelming sense that punishing criminals differently based on
10 3
wealth is inherently unfair.
As Professor Lindgren has suggested, a blackmailer with
information about a crime compromises the public interest when he
takes money to keep silent, but we need to describe that public
interest more fully to understand whether the blackmailer is doing
any real harm by "bargaining with the state's chip." 10 4 The point
is not just that the blackmailer attempts to step into the shoes of the
state to bargain with the criminal; the problem is that those shoes
will never fit. Even if the blackmailer carefully calculates the likely
outcome if the crime is reported, he cannot perform one of the
state's most important tasks in articulating and enforcing the
criminal law: declaring societal norms in public and labeling as
Id. at 1085.
103 It seemed that way to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971), the Court struck down a sentencing scheme that required
convicted criminals who were unable to pay a fine immediately to spend time in
prison. See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970) ("[T]he Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling
placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants
irrespective of their economic status."). But see ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAw, supra
note 14, at 209 ("Since fines and imprisonment are simply different ways of
imposing disutility on violators, the Supreme Court is wrong to regard a sentence
that imposes a fine but provides for imprisonment if the defendant cannot or will
not pay the fine as discriminating against the poor.").
104 Lindgren, supra note 3, at 717.
102
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"criminal" the behavior that runs afoul of them. 10 5 Courts and
commentators have repeatedly recognized that criminal trials are
inherently public, in part because they communicate to the public
As Professor Barbara
the force of their collective values. 1° 6
Babcock has noted, criminal trials have cathartic benefits for a
society seeking a "reassurance of safety and the satisfaction of
revenge." 107 This is a goal fulfilled at all stages of criminal
justice-accusation, trial, vindication through 8acquittal, or condem10
nation through conviction and punishment.
This ongoing public activity helps to clarify not only the laws
that should be enforced, but also the laws that may need modification. 1° If the affirmative defense discussed in this Article could
be described accurately enough to exclude blackmail based on
violations of statutes that have fallen into desuetude, it would not
necessarily create incentives for blackmailers to invoke statutes that
are obsolete. But even the incriminating blackmail discussed in this
Article-designed to impose minimal social costs while increasing
socially beneficial deterrence-derives much of its legitimacy from
105

See Sally E. Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining

the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS.J. 151, 153 (1984) (stating that even in the civil
context, 'by the time a conflict is serious enough to warrant an outsider's intervention ... the grievant wants vindication, protection of his or her rights (as he or
she perceives them), an advocate to help in the battle, or a third party who will

uncover the 'truth' and declare the other party wrong").
106 See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public
event."); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]rials must be public and the public have a deep interest in trials."); State
v. Schmit, 139 N.W. 2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966) ("It is not unrealistic even in this
day to believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education and
hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration of justice."); WIGMORE,
supra note 9, at 438 ("The educative effect of public attendance is a material
advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance
acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial
remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy.").
107 Barbara A. Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1982).
108 See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961) ("The accusation and conviction or
acquittal, as much perhaps as the execution of punishment, [help] to restore the
imbalance which was created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the
temporarily lost feeling of security and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to
punish....'").
109 Keeping the enforcement of these statutes in the public sphere not only
gives prosecutors some discretion, as Landes and Posner suggest, but would also
help to hold the legislative branch accountable for the laws they pass and allow the
laws to remain in force. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the legislature has made prior judgments about the
categories of crime subject to blackmail.
Public enforcement of the criminal law also helps to insure that
criminals receive the protection of constitutional limitations on law
enforcement. 11 0 The exclusionary rule creates incentives for law
enforcement officers to comply with constitutional mandates
because evidence they gain in violation of the Constitution may be
inadmissable at the criminal defendant's trial. Blackmailers would
not feel these constraints, for criminals might pay blackmail to
conceal their crimes even when the blackmailer gains evidence in a
manner which would be unconstitutional if the government were the
11 1
actor.
Even the rhetoric of this Article highlights one of the dangers of
departing from public law enforcement. For linguistic ease, this
Article has repeatedly referred to the blackmailee as "the criminal."
This reveals that in the world of blackmail, the presumption of
innocence is only as strong as the blackmailer's uncertainty that she
can invoke the affirmative defense. That may not be strong enough
to make the private enforcer a suitable proxy for the state.
Indeed, the public enforcement of law may be the necessary
condition to balance the individual's interest in procedural
protections with the public's interest in the enforcement of
substantive norms. 112 When the United States Supreme Court
declared in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia113 that the
Constitution required criminal trials to be open to the public, the
Court noted that the "history of open trials in part reflects the
widespread acknowledgment.., that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have
110 See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)
("Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity,
all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other
institution might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to
operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.").
"I See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 88 (1974) ("[A]n
independent might be prohibited from privately exacting justice because his
procedure is known to be too risky and dangerous-that is, it involves a higher risk
(than another procedure) of punishing an innocent person or overpunishing a
guilty one . . ").
112 See BABCOCK, supra note 107, at 1140 ("The criminal trial, as the most vivid

and visible intersection of state and individual, simultaneously affirms the needs of
both our collective and separate selves.").
113 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and
114
its results."
Thus, public enforcement is crucial to the declarative function
of the criminal law, which involves public education and the
vindication of societal norms. These norms are both substantive
and procedural, collective and individualist. One product of public
education may be deterrence, but the law of blackmail may prove
that deterrence does not dominate these other goals.
Judge Posner has asserted that as an empirical matter, blackmail
is "quite possibly" a very rare crime. 115 The number of blackmail
cases is inherently difficult to measure, however, because so much
of the activity takes place in secret. Even if the crime were very
rare, the basis for blackmail's illegality would not be a trivial matter.
Blackmail captures the imagination of many legal scholars because
more than most crimes, it treads so closely to legitimate, even
encouraged, economic activity. In fact, much negotiation takes
place under circumstances involving some coercion or pressure on
one or both of the parties. We rarely punish this behavior or negate
the contracts that emerge from such negotiations. Instead, we
struggle with the fine points of negotiation theory and ethics to see
how much we can gain within the bounds of legality.
That does not mean that we morally approve of all the advantage-taking that can occur in legitimate negotiation. Some of the
residual discomfort associated with incriminating blackmail may
stem from this reluctance to expand, rather than contract, the range
of permissible pressure in negotiation. But then we come full circle
to the problem of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate threats,
proper from improper use of leverage, permissible from impermissible exploitation of superior bargaining strength. Granted, few
people commit blackmail. But a rule permitting blackmail could
radically change people's business and personal lives, as they
anticipate the ways they could become victim and perpetrator of a
new species of coercion in negotiation.

Id. at 570-71.
115 See Posner, supra note 3, at 1817.
114
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CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that leading blackmail theories have
largely ignored the ways in which incriminating blackmail might
deter crime by adding to the potential criminal's expected costs and
therefore do not satisfactorily explain why incriminating blackmail
should be illegal. To highlight this deterrent effect, this Article has
considered the consequences of giving blackmailers an affirmative
defense if they show that the blackmail "victim" was a criminal.
Allowing this affirmative defense and thereby placing the burden on
the blackmailer to prove the blackmailee's crime by a preponderance of evidence creates incentives for blackmailers to enhance the
costs of criminal activity. By preserving the illegality of other kinds
of blackmail-particularly blackmail based on embarrassing but not
incriminating information-this affirmative defense avoids creating
incentives to blackmail when the blackmail would not deter crime.
The reluctance to decriminalize even this limited form of
blackmail signals a more general desire for public involvement in
articulating and enforcing social norms. Even rules that increase
deterrence may harm the public if they fundamentally alter the
nature of law enforcement in ways inconsistent with prevailing
notions of justice. The fear is not that blackmail precludes public
justice or reduces the quantity of public involvement. Rather, the
concern is that we fundamentally alter the quality ofjustice when we
take enforcement away from a public audience. Blackmail based on
incriminating information is essentially private justice. It allows
private parties to assess the reach of the criminal law. It involves no
public review of the facts or interpretation of the law. It transfers
an otherwise public process to a private venue where records are
sealed and results are inaccessible.
Debate is ongoing about the dangers and benefits of private
justice in the civil context. As methods of private dispute resolution
evolve and parties increasingly turn from public fora to private
processes, we will discover the extent to which private processes are
consistent with and affect precedent, satisfy participants, and
produce results that the parties and the public can live with. At this
point, little evidence exists to allow us to assert conclusively that
private justice resolves civil conflicts justly. If we maintain some
skepticism in the civil context, how much more cautious ought we
to be in the criminal context, where the rights at stake are graver
and the unresolved conflicts presumably more destructive?
Blackmail may perform some of the functions of criminal justice
admirably as it deters crime. But blackmail as private justice cannot
substitute for criminal justice, which by its very nature requires
public processes.

